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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, cryptocurrencies have been the topic of discussion everywhere
from boardrooms to celebrities’ social media accounts. They are a new form
of investing that seems to make money magically appear, but is it too good to
be true? Global regulators are unsure of how these new cryptocurrencies
should be treated.1 The United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has taken a position on the matter and declared that some of these investments are considered “securities” under U.S. law, meaning they are subject to the vigorous securities regulation regime.2 Declaring these investments
securities adds a layer of protection to investors who might fall victim of fraud
resulting from cryptocurrencies.3
The United States is not the only country that has taken notice of the potential need for regulation in the cryptocurrency markets. Regulators in Asia
have also responded to the growing cryptocurrency market.4 China has banned
initial coin offerings (ICOs), discussed below, and closed cryptocurrency exchanges over concerns of fraud.5 South Korean regulators have begun investigating cryptocurrency-related compliance in large banks and have also prohibited ICOs.6 Australian legislators are considering legislation which would
put regulation of cryptocurrencies within the reach of AUSTRAC, Australia’s
financial intelligence agency.7
Regulatory bodies across the globe have not been uniform in responding
to cryptocurrencies.8 How can investors have any confidence in the market
with so much uncertainty? Opening U.S. tribunals, and thus its securities

1
See LAW LIBRARY OF CONG., REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY AROUND THE WORLD
(2018) (demonstrating the differences between cryptocurrency regulations over the world).
2
See Kate Rooney, SEC Chief Says Agency Won’t Change Securities Laws to Cater to
Cryptocurrencies, CNBC (June 11, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/06/sec-chairma
n-clayton-says-agency-wont-change-definition-of-a-security.html (reporting that SEC
chairman Jay Clayton said that the SEC will not change the definition of a security to cater
to the new cryptocurrency markets and under the current definition of a security, tokens
used in an initial coin offering are securities).
3
See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/A
rticle/whatwedo.html (explaining how SEC regulations help investors as part of their trifold mission of “protect[ing] investors, maintain[ing] fair, orderly and efficient markets,
and facilitate[ing] capital formation”).
4
See Carlos M. Gutierrez, Jr., Asia Takes the Lead in Regulating Cryptocurrency Markets, ASIA TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.atimes.com/asia-leads-way-cryptocurrency-r
egulation/.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See generally REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 1
(showing how different regions are regulating the cryptocurrency markets completely differently).
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antifraud regime, to investors who have been harmed in fraudulent cryptocurrency transactions may increase investor confidence and potentially foster
capital markets.9 There are two ways that the United States deters fraudulent
securities transactions.10 First, our securities regulation regime allows the SEC
to bring enforcement action and, second, for individuals to bring private rights
of action.11
This Note aims to evaluate how the doctrine of extraterritoriality applies
to securities regulation in the cryptocurrency market. Specifically, this Note
will examine how the extraterritorial application of Rule 10b-5 applies to the
emerging cryptocurrency market for both SEC enforcement actions and private rights of actions. Part I will provide some background information about
what a cryptocurrency is and how Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) work. Part II
will discuss how the U.S. defines a security that falls within our regulation
regime, how some Initial Coin Offerings fall within the purview of our securities regime, and how the SEC has responded to Initial Coin Offerings. Part
III will discuss the current state of the law of extraterritorial application of
securities regulation, both for SEC enforcement actions and private actions.
Finally, Part IV will provide some analysis about the future of private 10b-5
causes of action for foreign investors.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Cryptocurrencies
To begin the inquiry into the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities
law in the context of cryptocurrency markets, the first step is understanding
what cryptocurrencies are. Both cryptocurrency and traditional forms of currency are only as valuable as society believes they are. Traditional currencies’
bills and coins are just tokens we use to exchange goods and services based
on how valuable we believe it is.12 Cash has no inherent value; it is a piece of
paper.13 As technology has developed over the years, there is no longer a need
for currency to take the form of a physical token, like cash.14 Transactions
began moving away from a physical token of currency long before

9

STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS
9 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 4th ed. 2015) (noting that U.S. securities laws foster transparency and accuracy which is helpful to the capital markets).
10
See generally Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 2173 (2010).
11
Id.
12
Martin Tillier, What is a Cryptocurrency?, NASDAQ (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.na
sdaq.com/article/what-is-a-cryptocurrency-cm910816.
13
Id.
14
Id.
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cryptocurrencies were even an idea.15 This is illustrated by the development
of written checks and eventually debit cards.16 No cash ever changes hands in
transactions involving these methods.17 The bank simply reduces your balance
and increases someone else’s by updating a ledger. 18
Cryptocurrencies are somewhat similar to the idea of debit cards and written checks, but there are some key differences.19 First, they are not backed by
a government.20 Instead, cryptocurrencies are created and controlled by algorithms.21 The algorithms determine how transactions are made and recorded
and how new cryptocurrencies are released.22 Instead of completing transactions through banks or another intermediary, cryptocurrency users and their
recorded transactions create a system known as the blockchain.23 This blockchain system of “peer-to-peer” transactions instead of government issued currencies is the first major distinction between traditional currencies and cryptocurrencies.24
The second difference is that the total amount of a cryptocurrency in circulation is limited.25 This differs from traditional currency because governments can, and do, simply print more money to increase the amount in circulation.26 As economies grow, governments create more currency to allow for
the growth.27 Adding more currency into the circulation of that currency is
what causes inflation.28 Because of this, traditional currencies are based on an
inflationary model.29 Cryptocurrencies, on the other hand, are exactly the opposite because they operate on a deflationary model.30 The total supply of a
cryptocurrency in circulation is restricted.31 As the economy grows, instead
of adding more cryptocurrency into circulation, each unit of cryptocurrency
has more buying power than it previously had.32 For example, something that

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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costs one unit of cryptocurrency today will cost a fraction of the same unit as
time passes and the economy grows.33
B. Initial Coin Offerings
On its face, the concept of cryptocurrency might seem to be outside of the
SEC’s scope of enforcement. However, the concept of initial coin offerings
(ICOs) makes it clear that cryptocurrencies are within the SEC’s scope of
power. Promoters have been selling virtual tokens, a unit of cryptocurrency,
in ICOs.34 Those who wish to purchase the virtual tokens through an ICO can
use traditional currency to make their purchase.35 Sometimes these promoters
lead purchasers to believe that they will receive a return on their investment.36
Sometimes those in need of capital (i.e. start-ups or online projects) use ICOs
as a way to raise capital without going through the hassle of issuing stock or
finding venture capitalists to invest.37 In this regard, ICOs are similar to
crowdfunding,38 which is regulated by the SEC.39
C. The Howey Test
The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) defines what a security is.40
That definition includes a catchall provision listing “investment contracts” as
a security falling within the purview of the Securities Act and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).41 In 1946, the Supreme Court gave
guidance on what the broad sweeping “investment contract” means.42 An investment contract, and thus a security within the reach of the SEC’s

33

Id.
Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 25, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_coinofferings.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Nathaniel Popper, An Explanation of Initial Coin Offerings, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/technology/what-is-an-initial-coin-offering.
html.
38
Id.
39
See generally Regulation Crowdfunding, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.se
c.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/regcrowdfunding.
40
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §77b(a)(1) (2012) (defining the term “security”
for purposes of the Act).
41
Id.; see also CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 9, at 97 (explaining that the reason the
inclusion of “investment contracts” in the definition of a security makes the SEC’s power
broad by leaving the definition of investment contract up for interpretation).
42
See generally SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
34
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regulation, is any instrument that meets the requirements of the Howey test.43
The Howey test was established in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.44 The defendants
in that case were two Florida corporations under the same control and management.45 The company owned large tracts of citrus farms in Florida. Leading up to the case, the company would offer up half of its acreage to the public
to “help [them] finance additional development.”46
Each prospective customer was offered both a land sale and service contract.47 The land sale contract allowed the purchasers to get a portion of the
acreage of the citrus farm.48 The service contract allowed Howey’s other company, one under the same management and control, to cultivate the land, making it profitable for the purchaser.49 Additionally, the company told potential
buyers that it was not feasible to invest in a land contract unless they also
purchase the service contract.50 The service contract gave the cultivating company a leasehold interest in the purchased land and “full and complete” possession for ten years with no cancellation option.51
The purchasers were mostly out-of-state residents and professionals with
no knowledge or skills necessary to cultivate a citrus farm.52 The court speculated that purchasers were attracted by the arrangement because of the expectation of profits, not because they were interested in cultivating citrus
trees.53 Were the Securities Act and the Exchange Act intended to regulate
these kinds of investing instruments? The court took the opportunity to not
only decide this case, but to create a test for future inquiries into defining investment contracts.54
The court concluded in Howey that the sales and service contracts taken
together constituted an investment contract.55 Thus, the investors in the citrus
farm could turn to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act for protection.56
The court looked to the Congressional intent of defining securities and noted
that
43

Id. at 297 (stating that an affirmative answer to whether the contract was an investment
contract brings into operation the registration requirement of the Act).
44
Id. at 301 (“[t]he test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a
common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.”).
45
Id. at 294–95.
46
Id. at 295.
47
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294 (1946).
48
Id. at 295.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 296–97 (1946).
53
Id.
54
Id. at 301 (establishing a test that is still used today).
55
Id. at 299.
56
Id. at 300.
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[t]he term “investment contract” is undefined by the Securities
Act or by relevant legislative reports. But, the term was common in many state “blue sky” laws in existence prior to the
adoption of the federal statute and, although the term was also
undefined by those state laws, it had been broadly construed
by state courts so as to afford the investing public a full measure of protection. Form was disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed upon economic reality. An investment contract thus came to mean a contract or scheme for “the placing
of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure
income or profit from its employment.” This definition was
uniformly applied by state courts to a variety of situations where individuals were led to invest money in a common
enterprise with the expectation that they would earn a profit
solely through the efforts of the promoter or of some one other
than themselves.57
By including “investment contract,” a concept that had been utilized by
states before federal regulation of securities, in the definition of a security, the
court held that Congress intended to use the same “investment contract” that
had been “crystallized by [its] prior judicial interpretation.”58 Thus,
an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party,
it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the
physical assets employed in the enterprise.59
D. Howey Test and Cryptocurrencies—The DAO Report
The recent buzz over cryptocurrencies led SEC chairman Jay Clayton to
make a public statement regarding cryptocurrencies and ICOs.60 Prior to the
statement, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement had investigated a

57

Id. at 298 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
SEC. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
59
Id. at 298–99.
60
See Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017) https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statementclayton-2017-12-11 (“The world’s social media platforms and financial markets are abuzz
about cryptocurrencies and [ICOs].”).
58
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Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO).61 The SEC’s investigation
had to answer a threshold question to determine the application of U.S. securities laws to the offer and sale of DAO Tokens: Are DAO Tokens securities?62 The SEC determined the DAO Tokens were securities.63 The report
that followed the DAO investigation (DAO Report) “reiterate[d the] fundamental principles of the U.S. federal securities laws and describe[d] their applicability to a new paradigm—virtual organizations or capital raising entities
that use distributed ledger or blockchain technology to facilitate capital raising
and/or investment and the related offer and sale of securities.”64 In the DAO
Report, the SEC used the Howey test to determine whether these new form of
investment instruments were securities within the reach of U.S. securities
laws.65
The first element of the Howey test is whether investors invested money.66
The SEC determined that this element was satisfied in the DAO.67 Investors
in the DAO used Ethereum (ETH), a cryptocurrency, to purchase the DAO
Tokens.68 This was sufficient to satisfy the “investment of money” requirement because “money” does not need to take the form of cash.69
The second and third elements of the Howey test require that investors put
their money into a “common enterprise” and that they do so reasonably expecting profits.70 The DAO Report analyzed these two elements of the Howey
test together to determine that investments in the DAO token did, in fact, invest in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits.71 Some
promotional materials disseminated by the DAO told investors that the program “was a for-profit entity whose objective was to fund projects in exchange
for a return on investment.”72 The ETH paid by investors in exchange for the
61
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, Release No. 81207, REP. OF THE INVESTIGATION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SEC. EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO (July 25,
2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf (explaining that DAO is
a broad term used to describe a virtual organization comprised of computer code whose
transactions are executed over a blockchain) [hereinafter DAO Report].
62
Id. at 1.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 2.
65
Id.
66
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (defining a security as partially
the “investment of money . . . .”).
67
DAO Report, supra note 61, at 11.
68
Id. at 2–3, 11.
69
Id. (citing Uselton v. Comm. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th
Cir. 1991) (“[I]n spite of Howey’s reference to an ‘investment of money,’ it is well established that cash is not the only form of contribution or investment that will create an investment contract.”).
70
Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99.
71
DAO Report, supra note 61, at 11.
72
Id. at 11–12 (emphasis added).
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DAO Tokens were “pooled and available to the DAO to fund projects.”73 The
DAO Token holders could share in any profits from the projects executed by
the pooled funds. The SEC determined this meant “a reasonable investor
would have been motivated, at least in part, by the prospect of profits on their
investment of ETH in The DAO.”74
The fourth and final element of the Howey test is that the profit is “derived
from the managerial efforts of others.”75 The SEC determined that the DAO
also met this element.76 This element requires that the efforts made by others
are significant in that they are the managerial efforts which affect the failure
or success of the enterprise.77 “The investors’ profits were to be derived from
the managerial efforts” of the company’s co-founders.78 Even though the investors were awarded voting rights, the SEC nevertheless concluded that the
managerial efforts of others ultimately determined the success of the enterprise.79 The voting power awarded to the investors was limited, so the investors were still substantially reliant on others for their profits.80
E. SEC Response
Other than the DAO Report, the SEC has taken more measures to be proactive with the rise in technology and the emerging cryptocurrency market.81
In 2017, music producer DJ Khaled and boxer Floyd Mayweather caught the
SEC’s attention.82 Both celebrities promoted Centra Tech’s ICO on their social media accounts.83 The SEC separately charged Centra Tech with performing a fraudulent ICO.84 Khaled and Mayweather failed to disclose that they
had been paid $50,000 and $100,000, respectively, by Centra Tech to promote
the allegedly fraudulent ICO.85 The SEC has since warned consumers to be

73

Id. at 12.
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 13.
80
Id. at 13–14.
81
Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (May
16, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-oversight-secs-division-enforc
ement (referring to multiple instances where the SEC Division of Enforcement helped investors by taking measures to prevent or restrain fraudulent ICOs).
82
Two Celebrities Charged with Unlawfully Touting Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-268.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
74
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especially cautious with ICOs that are endorsed by celebrities.86 In this specific case, the SEC is concerned that the celebrities’ failure to disclose the
payments would make the endorsements appear to be unbiased, rather than a
paid endorsement.87 Although both Khaled and Mayweather have settled with
the SEC, this investigation illustrates that the SEC is taking these potentially
fraudulent ICOs very seriously.88 The charges against Khaled and Mayweather were the first charges brought by the SEC against individuals for promoting ICOs.89
Additionally, a new unit within the Division of Enforcement, the Cyber
Unit, has taken action to address ICOs and cryptocurrencies since the publication of the DAO Report.90 For instance, the SEC issued a statement saying,
“[w]hen market participants engage in fraud under the guise of offering digital
instruments—whether characterized as virtual currencies, coins, tokens, or the
like—the SEC . . . will look beyond form, examine the substance of the activity and prosecute violations of the federal securities . . . laws.”91 The Cyber
Unit has also brought a number of enforcement actions relating to ICOs.92 One
enforcement action was halting an ICO which was selling digital tokens to its
investors to raise capital for projects using blockchain to provide a food review service.93 The SEC contacted the company to inform them that their conduct constituted unregistered securities offers and sales.94 The company subsequently halted its ICO and refunded its investors all proceeds raised before
any tokens were offered.95 The SEC intervened because over the course of the
offering, promoters emphasized that the investors could expect efforts of the
company to lead to a value increase in their tokens.96

86

Id.
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 81.
91
Joint Statement by SEC and CFTC Enforcement Directors Regarding Virtual Currency Enforcement Actions, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.sec.g
ov/news/public-statement/joint-statement-sec-and-cftc-enforcement-directors.
92
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 81.
93
Company Halts ICO After SEC Raises Registration Concerns, 2012-227, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-227.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.; see also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (this promotional promise,
coupled with the investors putting in money to the common enterprise of the company,
satisfies the four elements of the Howey test, thus enabling the SEC to step in and issue a
cease and desist.).
87
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III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
As a general principle, legislation of Congress is meant only to apply
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, absent a contrary intent
by Congress.97 Thus, unless there is an affirmative intention of Congress
clearly expressed giving a statute extraterritorial effect, courts presume it is
primarily concerned with domestic conditions.98 Simply put, when a statute
does not give a clear indication of an extraterritorial application, there is a
presumption excluding any extraterritoriality.99
A. The Securities and Exchange Acts
The Securities and Exchange Acts contain antifraud provisions which can
be utilized by the SEC to bring enforcement actions and by plaintiffs to bring
a private right of action when they have been harmed by fraudulent securities
transactions.100 The Securities Act and Exchange Acts were passed in response to the stock market crash in 1929, which was widely believed to be
caused by fraudulent securities activities.101 As such, the antifraud provisions
supplied by both the Securities Act and Exchange Act are written liberally in
attempt to protect investors.102 Section 11 of the Securities Act allows for liability when a registration statement contains “an untrue statement of material
fact or omit[s] to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary
to make the statements therein not misleading . . . .”103 Section 12(a)(2) of the
Securities Act, on the other hand, creates civil liability for material omissions
or misstatements in securities offerings and sales made by “means of a prospectus or oral communication.”104
The Exchange Act also contains antifraud provisions. These antifraud provisions focus more on the conduct in the markets, as opposed to the Securities
Act’s antifraud focus on preventing fraud within the registration and disclosure process.105 An antifraud provision from the Exchange Act brings an

97

Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
Id.
99
Id.
100
Joshua L. Boehm, Private Securities Fraud Litigation After Morrison v. National
Austl. Bank: Reconsidering a Reliance-Based Approach to Extraterritoriality, 53 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 249, 252 (2012).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §77k(a) (2012).
104
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §77l(a)(2) (2012).
105
Boehm, supra note 100.
98

574

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 48:563

overwhelming majority of securities fraud cases: §10(b) of the Exchange Act
and its implementing regulation, Rule 10b-5.106
B. §10(b) and Rule 10b-5
Since the vast majority of securities fraud class actions are brought as Rule
10b-5 complaints,107 this note will focus on the 10b-5 fraud cause of action
and its extraterritorial reach to the cryptocurrency market. Before explaining
the law’s extraterritorial application, one must understand that law. Rule 10b5 antifraud liability mirrors the common law fraud claim. To establish a 10b5 cause of action, a plaintiff must prove that there was either a material misstatement or omission, scienter, reliance, causation, and harm.108
Rule 10b-5 is widely regarded as a catch-all provision to deter fraudulent
activity in the capital markets.109 It might seem strange that Rule 10b-5 is considered the catch-all antifraud provision because it requires plaintiffs to carry
a higher burden of proving that the defendant acted with scienter.110 Nevertheless, Rule 10b-5 allows more claims than other antifraud securities laws
because the rule has fewer restrictions than other antifraud provisions.111
106

Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUMB. L. REV.
1301, 1302 (2008).
107
Id.
108
See Section 10(b) Litigation: The Current Landscape, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N (June
29, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2014/10/03
_kasner/ (explaining that “[t]o establish liability under §10(b), a plaintiff must show that:
[t]he defendant made a material misstatement or omission; [t]he misstatement or omission
was made . . . with scienter; [t]here is a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the plaintiff’s purchase or sale of a security; [t]he plaintiff relied on the misstatement or omission; [t]he plaintiff suffered economic loss; and [t]here is a causal connection
between the material misrepresentation or omission and the plaintiff’s loss.”).
109
See e.g., Douglas C. Conroy, Michael L. Zuppone & David J. Kaplan, SEC Anti-Fraud
Rule 10b-5 Broadly Construed by Supreme Court, PAUL HASTINGS (July 1, 2002),
https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=36adde69-2334-6428-811cff00004cbded (referring to SEC’s Rule 10b-5 as a “catch-all” antifraud provision).
110
See Section 10(b) Litigation: The Current Landscape, supra note 108 (listing that a
misstatement or omission be made with scienter as one of the elements of a 10b-5 claim).
111
Compare Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (2018), with Civil Liabilities on Account of False Registrations Statement, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 77k (effective Nov. 3, 1998) (providing antifraud liability only for material omissions or
misstatements made in the registration statement which means that a plaintiff cannot bring
a §11 claim for any fraudulent activity that arises outside the context of the registration
statement and restricts the defendants of a §11 claim to an enumerated list) and Civil Liabilities Arising in Connection with Prospectuses and Communication, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k
(2018) (providing antifraud protection to limited class of plaintiffs that only include those
who purchased or sold securities against a limited class of defendants) and 15 U.S.C.A. §
12(a)(2) (limiting the its scope to misstatement or omissions only in the prospectus or oral
communication).
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There is no private cause of action explicitly sanctioned in §10(b) or Rule
10b-5.112 However, the federal courts have recognized an implied private
cause of action for securities fraud in Rule 10b-5.113 Justice Rehnquist referred
to the implied private right of action as a “judicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn.”114 This sentiment reflects the expansive
liability that the private cause of action created by Rule 10b-5.
The private right of action under 10b-5 is an important antifraud mechanism. The SEC has limited resources and believes that private rights of actions
are a necessary supplement to their own efforts to prevent fraud.115 The private
right of action provides additional deterrence from fraud,116 so this system
could be a helpful mechanism to keep cryptocurrency markets free from fraud.
As discussed below, it is more difficult for plaintiffs bringing a private right
of action under 10b-5 to show that extraterritorial application is appropriate
than for the SEC bringing an enforcement action. This note will discuss both
the SEC’s ability to bring a 10b-5 action with extraterritorial implications and
the same for a private right of action. It is necessary to examine both SEC
action and private action because of the importance of the private right of action in supplementing the SEC’s ability to police the market.
C. The Courts’ Interpretation of the Laws’ Extraterritorial Application
The Supreme Court addressed the extraterritorial reach of the United
States’ securities regulation regime, specifically section 10b and Rule 10b-5,
in Morrison v. National Australia Bank in 2010.117 National Australia Bank
used HomeSide, a mortgage servicer based in the United States.118 For years,
HomeSide’s executives manipulated their financial models to make their
mortgage servicing rights seem more valuable.119 They would submit the
fraudulent information to National Australia Bank, which would in turn inflate
National Australia Bank’s annual reports.120 National Australia Bank’s executives were aware of HomeSide’s fraud and that their own statements were
inflated as a result, but they nevertheless included the false information in

112
See Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2018) (omitting an explicit private right of action).
113
See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1917) (“[I]t
was held in 1946 . . . that there was an implied private right of action under [Rule 10b5].”).
114
Id. at 737.
115
CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 9.
116
Id.
117
See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
118
Boehm, supra note 100, at 257.
119
Id.
120
Id.
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their own reports.121 Further, National Australia Bank’s executives praised
HomeSide’s success in public statements.122 National Australia Bank eventually announced the write-downs relating to HomeSide in 2001, equating to
roughly two billion U.S. dollars.123 As a result, numerous Australian shareholders who had purchased National Australia Bank stock in Australia filed
suit in America.124
Prior to Morrison, the Second Circuit developed two doctrines to determine whether courts had jurisdiction to hear section 10(b) claims: the “conducts” test and the “effects” test.125 Morrison was brought to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on a “conducts” test theory of subject matter
jurisdiction.126 The conducts test focuses on the underlying activity causing
fraud, as opposed to the effects test’s approach of focusing on the fraud affecting U.S. investors and markets.127 The Second Circuit determined that the
critical factor of the conduct test is that “significant conduct” in furtherance
of the fraud occurred in the United States.128 Under the conducts test, it did
not necessarily matter whether U.S. shareholders or foreign shareholders ultimately endured the loss caused by the fraud.129 Judge Henry Friendly, when
assessing the rationale of the conduct test, reasoned that Congress certainly
wanted to avoid the United States “[becoming] used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled only
to foreigners.”130 In Morrison, the Second Circuit used the conducts test to
conclude that the U.S.-based conduct was not “at the heart of the fraud” and
therefore insufficient to support jurisdiction.131 While HomeSide ran its operations in the United States, it was National Australia Bank’s Australian-based
executives’ responsibility to report correct information to its shareholders.132
In the appellate court’s view, it was the Australian executives’ oversight, not
the manipulation of numbers in the United States, that was central to the fraud
that harmed investors.133
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Id. at 253–54.
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Id. at 257.
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Id. at 254.
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Id. at 255.
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Id.
130
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975) (addressing whether foreign
investors had subject matter jurisdiction under federal securities laws by defrauded foreign
individuals where the U.S. was used to manufacture the “fraudulent security devices”),
abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
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Boehm, supra note 100, at 258.
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These tests were rejected and deemed irrelevant to the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws in the cryptocurrency context when the Supreme Court, in Morrison, disagreed with Second Circuit’s analysis.134 The
Court noted that the “Second Circuit never put forward a textual or even extratextual basis” for the conducts and effects tests.135 Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, disagreed with the Second Circuit on whether this was a
question of subject matter jurisdiction.136 Instead, he said that §10(b)’s extraterritorial reach was a question of merit.137 This conclusion flowed from the
canon, discussed above, which presumes, absent a clear intent of Congress, a
lack of extraterritorial application of a statute.138
The Morrison holding was that §10(b) only applies to transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges and domestic transactions in other securities.139 The holding in Morrison is an important step in understanding the
development of the law concerning the extraterritorial application of antifraud
provisions in U.S. securities laws in response to fraud in cryptocurrency markets. According to the Court, U.S. securities laws focus on the purchase and
sale of securities in the U.S., not on the place of deception.140 The Court essentially replaced the conducts and effects test with a new transactional test.141
This new test only allows a private right of action to foreign plaintiffs for
§10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in two situations.142 The transactions giving rise to the
claim must have either (1) occurred in the United States or (2) involved a
security listed on a U.S. exchange.143
D. Congress Passes Dodd-Frank
Just days after the Supreme Court issued the Morrison opinion,144 Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd-Frank).145 Two provisions of Dodd-Frank were in direct response
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Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 247–48 (2010).
Id. at 258.
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Boehm, supra note 100, at 258.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 259.
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Andrew Rocks, Whoops! The Imminent Reconciliation of U.S. Securities Laws with
International Comity After Morrison v. National Austl. Bank and the Drafting Error in the
Dodd-Frank Act, 56 VILL. L. REV. 163, 165 (2011).
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Id. at 188.
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Meny Elgadeh, Morrison v. National Austl. Bank: Life After Dodd-Frank, 16
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to the Court’s Morrison holding.146 Sections 929p and 929y of Dodd-Frank
are the relevant provisions.147 Dodd-Frank §929p provides extraterritorial jurisdiction of securities laws for violations involving “(1) conduct within the
United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation,
even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves
only foreign investors,” or “(2) conduct occurring outside the United States
that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.”148 This provision of Dodd-Frank essentially codifies the “conducts” and “effects” tests149
that the Second Circuit relied upon before the Supreme Court in Morrison
rejected the tests.150 Dodd-Frank §929y, however, only authorizes extraterritorial jurisdiction for actions brought “by the Commission or the United
States,” excluding private actions from the legislative reinstatement of the
conducts and effects test in §929p.151
These provisions of Dodd-Frank seem to fail at capturing Congress’s intent.152 When Representative Paul Kanjorski, a leader in the drafting of DoddFrank, debated the law on the House floor, he asserted that the object of §929p
is to rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application.153 This intent
seems unfulfilled when compared to the pre-Dodd-Frank Morrison decision.154 The Morrison decision clarified that there is no jurisdictional limit on
the extraterritorial application of §10(b).155 Instead, the restriction on the use
of U.S. tribunals stems from the meaning of the statute, which is interpreted
with a presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law.156 Section
929p does not directly address the Court’s holding,157 but instead addresses
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in actions brought by the SEC. This does not
include whether the securities laws can be applied extraterritorially.158

146
Id. at 592 (explaining that Dodd-Frank addressed numerous financial regulatory concerns, but that two provisions of Dodd-Frank were directly related to the court’s Morrison
holding).
147
Id.
148
Id.
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Boehm, supra note 100, at 250.
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Elgadeh, supra note 145, at 592.
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Id. at 593.
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Rocks, supra note 141, at 188.
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See Clearly Gottlieb Steen, District Judge Rules That Dodd-Frank Allows SEC to
Bring Securities Fraud Claims Over Certain Foreign Transactions, U. OXFORD FAC. L.
BUS. L. BLOG (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/04/
district-judge-rules-dodd-frank-allows-sec-bring-securities-fraud (explaining the tension
between the Morrison decision and the passage of Dodd-Frank).
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E. Uncertainty About the Impact of Dodd-Frank on SEC Enforcement
Actions
Courts have interpreted the effect of Dodd-Frank §929p’s conduct and effects test on the Morrison holding issuing the transactional test differently.159
In SEC v. Chicago Convention Center, the Tenth Circuit addressed how
Dodd-Frank and the Morrison decision interacted with each other.160 In this
case, the SEC alleged that the defendants fraudulently sold millions of dollars’
worth of securities to over 250 Chinese nationals investors who hoped to obtain U.S. citizenship through their investment.161 The investors were allegedly
lured into making investments because of the E13-5 Program created under
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990.162 This program allowed foreign
nationals to qualify for a green card “if the individuals invest $1,000,000 . . .
creating or preserving at least 10 jobs for U.S. workers.”163 The SEC brought
the suit and sought injunctive relief.164
The defendants argued that the Morrison decision applied to the case and
that it should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.165 The defendants asserted that under the transactional test put forth in Morrison, the SEC is unable
to assert a claim against them because the transactions at issue were not domestic transactions.166 The SEC argued Dodd-Frank revived the conducts and
effects test for SEC actions, superseding Morrison.167 The court recognized
that the interaction of these two standards create a “complex interpretation
issue,”168 but ultimately did not come to a conclusion on that interpretation
issue.169 Under any of the tests, the SEC stated a claim. The motion to dismiss
was denied without reaching the issue of whether Dodd-Frank superseded
Morrison for claims brought by the SEC.170
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Compare SEC v. Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 905, 909–917 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (suggesting that Dodd-Frank may not have successfully amended the securities
laws), with SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1291–93 (D. Utah 2017)
(finding clear indication of congressional intent to codify the conducts and effects test).
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See SEC v. Chi. Convention Ctr., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 909–17 (explaining how to interpret Dodd-Frank §929p(b) in light of the Morrison decision being issued just a few days
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A federal judge did eventually decide how the passage of Dodd-Frank affected the Supreme Court’s holding in Morrison for actions brought by the
SEC.171 Judge Parrish’s decision in Traffic Monsoon was the first federal ruling deciding this issue. The SEC brought an action against Traffic Monsoon,
an internet advertising company, in which the SEC alleged that the company
was involved in an illegal Ponzi scheme.172 The SEC alleged that Traffic Monsoon’s activity was in violation of §10(b) of the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5,
and §17(a) of the Securities Act. 173
Traffic Monsoon used Morrison’s transactional test to argue that the SEC
did not have authority to regulate its transactions.174 Traffic Monsoon argued
that since 90% of customers purchased its securities over the internet and the
customers were located outside of the U.S. when they made the purchases,
these transactions were primarily foreign and not within the SEC’s reach.175
The SEC argued that Dodd-Frank applied the conducts and effects test to all
similar cases.176 The SEC asserted that the language and history of DoddFrank demonstrate that Congress intended to reinstate this test for actions
brought by the SEC regarding transnational securities fraud.177 Under the conduct and effects test, the SEC could bring a claim against Traffic Monsoon
because Traffic Monsoon’s conduct of creating, marketing, selling, and managing its investment scheme did occur within the U.S.178
The court agreed with the SEC and held that Dodd-Frank superseded Morrison for actions brought by the SEC. Dodd-Frank sufficiently rebutted the
general judicial presumption against extraterritoriality for enforcement actions brought by the SEC under §10(b) of the Exchange Act and §17(a) of the
Securities Act.179
The court noted that §929p(b) was drafted prior to Morrison, at a time in
which circuit courts widely applied the conduct and effects test.180 In a context
where the Supreme Court had not yet issued its Morrison decision, the court
reasoned that Dodd-Frank simply codified the already-prevailing standard.181
The last meeting to reconcile the House and Senate bills occurred on the day
the Supreme Court issued Morrison.182 As such, the court stated that “[i]t
strains credulity” to assume that legislators considered the Court’s decision
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
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when finalizing Dodd-Frank.183 Judge Parrish concluded, “[t]o conform Section 929P(b) to the Morrison opinion at the last minute would be like requiring
a steaming battleship to turn on a dime to retrieve a lifejacket that fell overboard,” and “[t]hus the court does not presume that Congress intended Section
929P(b) to be a nullity.”184
The court in Traffic Monsoon noted that legislators who worked on the bill
explicitly expressed their understanding that Dodd-Frank codified the conduct
and effects test.185 Further, the court reasoned that the assumption that Congress intended the amendment “to be mere surplusage, with no discernable
effect, flies in the face of reason” because §929P(b) would be a nullity if Morrison applied to SEC actions under §§10(b) and 17(a).186 The court explained,
“[i]t would be pointless to clarify that district courts had jurisdiction to hear
Section 10(b) and 17(a) claims based on certain extraterritorial transactions
unless Congress also intended that these statutes be applied extraterritorially.”187
Though the effect of Dodd-Frank on the Morrison decision in terms of the
extraterritoriality of §10(b) in SEC enforcement actions is uncertain,188 this
Note follows the Traffic Monsoon interpretation of the issue. This leads to the
assumption that Dodd-Frank supersedes the Morrison decision for SEC enforcement actions.189 Accordingly, the SEC can use U.S. tribunals to bring
actions against foreign transactions when those transactions meet the conducts
and effects test.190
The conducts and effects test under Dodd-Frank gives the SEC a broader
ability to bring enforcement actions against unregistered ICOs abroad than an
individual has under Morrison’s transactional test. The language of DoddFrank §929p allows the SEC to bring an action against foreign conduct so
long as the transactions meet either the conducts test or the effects test.191 The
conducts test focuses “on the nature of [the] conduct within the United States
as it relates to carrying out the alleged fraudulent scheme.”192 The rationale

183

Id.
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Compare SEC v. Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F.Supp.2d 905, 909–16 (N.D. Ill.
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behind this test is to ensure that the United States does not become a base for
fraudulent activity, harming foreign investors.193
There is a broad range of what level of domestic conduct is sufficient to
satisfy the conducts test. Some circuits require that the domestic conduct in
itself constitutes a violation of U.S. securities laws.194 Other courts, however,
require only some activity that is significant to the furtherance of the fraudulent scheme within the United States in order to satisfy the conducts test.195
These two approaches represent extreme ends of the spectrum,196 but many
courts fall in between these two approaches.197 These courts generally find
that when some activity within the United States was significant to the
scheme, the conducts test is satisfied.198
Even if the conducts test is not satisfied, the SEC can still bring an action
if it satisfies the effects test. The effects test is satisfied when conduct occurring in foreign countries “cause[s] foreseeable and substantial harm to interests in the United States.”199 The rationale behind the effects test comes from
the principle that acts done outside of a jurisdiction but nevertheless intend to
produce, threaten to produce, or foreseeably do produce harmful effects
within that jurisdiction, justify punishment of the offender by that jurisdiction
as if the actor had performed the activity within its borders.200 Under the
df (citing Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983)) [hereinafter
SEC 10b-5 Study].
193
Id. (citing Europe & Overseas Commodity Trades, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London,
147 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1998)).
194
See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[J]urisdiction will lie in American courts where the domestic conduct comprises all the elements of
a defendant’s conduct necessary to establish [a violation of the antifraud provisions].”).
195
See, e.g., Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983); Cont’l Grain
(Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser,
548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977).
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Id.; see, e.g., Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 657, 667 (finding that when
conduct “forms a substantial part of the alleged fraud and is material to its success,” the
conducts test is satisfied); Robinson v. TCI/US W. Commc’n Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905–06
n.10 (5th Cir. 1997) (domestic conduct must be “material” and “substantial”); Psimenos v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983) (domestic conduct must be “material” and “substantial”).
199
SEC 10b-5 Study, supra note 192, at 12 (citing Mak v. Wocom Commodities Ltd.,
112 F.3d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730
F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1984)); see also Europe & Overseas Commodity Trades, S.A. v.
Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1998); Interbrew S.A. v. Edperbrascan
Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
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SEC 10b-5 Study, supra note 192 (citing Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200,
206 (2d Cir. 1968)) (presuming that because it focused on domestic injuries for which the
United States has long been viewed as having a strong sovereign interest in redressing, the
effects test appears to have been relatively uncontroversial); see generally Strassheim v.
Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (“Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce
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effects test, the SEC could bring an action when American investors, securities traded on a U.S. exchange or issued by a U.S. entity, or U.S. domestic
markets are harmed.201
It is easier for the SEC to bring enforcement actions by satisfying the conducts and effects test rather than Morrison’s transactional test. In fact, the SEC
has already halted a foreign ICO and brought a Rule 10b-5 claim against the
company with no issues surrounding extraterritoriality. However, the private
right of action is an important enforcement tool of U.S. securities regulation.202 The SEC has limited resources to bring their enforcement actions. The
next section will therefore examine the private cause of action for extraterritorial Rule 10b-5 claims relating to cryptocurrency transactions.
IV. PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION
A. Morrison Transactional Test in Private Causes of Action
The Morrison transactional test still applies to private causes of action
when litigants claim a violation of §10(b). The Dodd-Frank §929p codification of the conducts and effects test only applies to actions brought by the SEC
or Department of Justice.203 In order to determine how a foreign investor can
bring a private action for fraudulent cryptocurrency actions, it is important to
look to how the test has been applied in U.S. courts.
The transactional test put forth in Morrison has two prongs, only one of
which must be met to create jurisdiction.204 The fraudulent security must be
either (i) connected with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, or (ii) purchased in the United States.205 It seems unlikely
that ICOs will satisfy the first prong of the transactional test because they are
not listed on formal exchange platforms such as the New York Stock Exchange. Therefore, this Note will focus on the second prong of the

and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the
harm as if he had been present at the effect . . . .”).
201
SEC 10b-5 Study, supra note 192, at 12–13.
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See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, LITIGATION RELEASE NO. 24170, SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. PLEXCORPS, ET AL. (2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litrel
eases/2018/lr24170.htm (announcing the SEC’s enforcement action against Dominic Lacroix, a Quebec securities law violator).
203
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111–203 §929p 124 Stat. 1865 (2010).
204
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
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See SEC 10b-5 Study, supra note 192 (noting that the court in Morrison instructed
that under the transactional test, “Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed
on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United
States.”).
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transactional test: that the security must have been purchased within the
United States.206
Many scholars recognize that determining what constitutes a domestic
transaction under the second prong of Morrison’s transactional test is one of
the most difficult issues the courts dealt with in the years following the Morrison decision.207 The difficulty stemmed from the Supreme Court’s silence
as to when a transaction occurs “in the United States” when the security was
not listed on a U.S. exchange.208 Courts set forth competing approaches to
determine when an off-exchange transaction occurs in the United States.209
Some courts presupposed that securities transactions can take place across
multiple jurisdictions.210 Under this approach, courts examine the entire transaction and “determine if any of the critical steps occurred” in the United
States.211 Other courts examined the transaction closely to determine precisely
when, in the course of the purchase or sale, “the parties incurred ‘irrevocable
liability’ to complete the transaction.”212 If the moment of irrevocable liability
occurred in the United States, then the investor could bring a private cause of
action under §10(b).213 If the moment of irrevocable liability occurred outside
of the United States, a §10(b) private cause of action would not be available
to investors.214
B. Tezos Decision
The issue of extraterritorial application of securities laws on cryptocurrency transactions came up in August 2018, when a U.S. District Court heard
a class action case in which a group of investors attempted “to hold a cryptocurrency enterprise liable for violations of federal securities law.”215 The
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complaint was brought against a number of defendants.216 A few located in
California were Arthur and Kathleen Breitman and their company, Dynamic
Ledger solutions.217 The Tezos Foundation, a nonprofit established by the
Breitmans based in Switzerland, was used to oversee the ICO at issue and was
another defendant.218 The final defendant was Bitcoin Suisse, a foreign firm
specializing in the crypto-financial sector which provided intermediary services to some ICO contributors.219
Unsurprisingly, this issue of extraterritoriality did not apply to the defendants located in California, since they clearly subjected themselves to United
States’ laws by being physically present within its borders.220 The court first
addressed Bitcoin Suisse’s role as a defendant.221 The court determined that it
did not have specific jurisdiction over Bitcoin Suisse.222 The intermediary did
not provide services for the Tezos ICO to any U.S. investor.223 This undermines the plaintiffs’ ability to prove that the defendant committed an intentional act expressly aimed at the forum state, causing harm which the defendant knew was likely to be suffered in the forum state.224 Accordingly, the
claim against Bitcoin Suisse was dismissed.225
The court next addressed its jurisdictional reach over the Tezos Foundation.226 Tezos’s website was freely accessible to U.S. citizens, was hosted on
an Arizona server, and was highly interactive.227 All of these factors were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under the relevant standard.228 As
216
Tod Sawicki & Christina Bortz, Cryptocurrency Securities Class Action Suits: Paving
the Path for U.S. Jurisdiction, ALSTON & BIRD SEC. LITIG. ADVISORY (Aug. 29, 2018), https
://www.alston.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2018/08/cryptocurrency-securitiesclass-action-suits.pdf.
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218
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In re Tezos Sec. Litig., No. 17-cv-06779-RS, 2018 WL 4293341, at *4–*6 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (ignoring the issue of personal jurisdiction regarding the Breitmans and Dynamic
Solutions, the California based defendants).
221
Id. at *5.
222
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224
Id. The court applied the three-part standard from Calder v. Jones to determine that
the court did not have specific jurisdiction over Bitcoin Suisse. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). The
court explained that this standard “requires that the defendant allegedly have (1) committed
an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor
Co., 374 F.3d 797, 803 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)).
225
In re Tezos Sec. Litig., No. 17-cv-06779-RS, 2018 WL 4293341, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
2018).
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Id. at *6.
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Id.; see also In re Tezos Sec. Litig., 2018 WL 4293341, at *6 (noting that these contacts to the United States are sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction because the
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such, the claim was not dismissed and the court was able to address the issue
of extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws as applied to an ICO.
Since this ICO was not listed on a domestic exchange, the second prong of
Morrison is the relevant inquiry. The defendants argued that the second prong
of Morrison requires that the transaction itself be domestic.229 The defendants
argued that the transactions took place outside of the United States and it
would therefore be inappropriate to apply U.S. securities laws to the transactions.230 The Tezos Foundation argued that their transactions occurred in Alderney, a British territory, because that was “the legal site of all ICO transactions” according to the forum selection clause in the contracts.231 The
defendants reasoned that the “contractual situs” of the transaction was foreign,
so the purchase and sale occurred outside of the U.S.232 The defendants also
argued that the location of their website was not as important as the location
of the foundation’s “contribution software.”233
The court rejected Tezos’s argument and found that the relevant inquiry is
where the actual situs of buying an unregistered security online and recorded
on the blockchain took place.234 In Tezos’s case, the actual situs occured
within the United States.235 The defendant used an interactive website that was
hosted on a server in Arizona and run primarily by someone in California.236
The plaintiff learned about the ICO from marketing almost exclusively targeting United States residents.237 Lastly, the plaintiff’s contribution to the ICO
became irrevocable only once it was validated by a network of “nodes” which
were clustered more densely in the United States than anywhere else in the
world.238 Taking all of these factors into account, the court determined this
was a domestic transaction and thus satisfied the second prong of Morrison.239
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V. ANALYSIS
If the Supreme Court were to hear an appeal of Tezos, they would likely
affirm and hold that Morrison was correctly applied in the cryptocurrency
context. The test adopted by the court in Morrison is relatively simple. Private
rights of action for Rule 10b-5 have extraterritorial application only when the
use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with
the purchase or sale with either a security listed on an American stock exchange or any other security in the United States.240
Cryptocurrencies generally are not traded on U.S. exchanges,241 but the
New York Stock Exchange has announced that it will become a platform for
cryptocurrencies.242 The exchange will create a company called Bakkt, which
will manage investors’ cryptocurrencies,243 starting with Bitcoin exclusively.244 Since Bitcoin is relatively established for a form of cryptocurrency,245 there is less of a fear of fraud relating to its trading. This means that
for purposes of 10b-5 claims, it is unlikely that investors will claim extraterritorial application based on the “purchase or sale of a security listed on an
American stock exchange” prong of the Morrison test.
Eliminating this prong means that most claims will be brought by alleging
that the purchase or sale of the security at issue occurred in the United States.
This is what the Tezos court held.246 As mentioned above, the Tezos court
determined that this fraudulent ICO did occur “in the United States” for various reasons.247 The “actual situs” of purchasing the unregistered securities occurred within the United States.248 The website used to sell the unregistered
securities was hosted on a server within the United States, the website was
controlled by a U.S. resident, and the transaction become irrevocable when it
was validated by a network of nodes that were clustered most densely in the
United States.249 The court determined all of these factors taken together lead
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to the conclusion that the transaction occurred in the United States.250 The
most important factor was arguably the dense cluster of nodes within the
United States.251
Is this holding consistent with how the second prong of Morrison has been
interpreted outside the context of cryptocurrencies? Courts typically use two
approaches to interpret the second prong of Morrison: one is to examine
whether any of the critical steps of the transaction occurred domestically and
the other is to examine where the parties incurred “irrevocable liability” that
completed the transaction.252 The Tezos decision is consistent with both approaches.
The “critical step” approach applies to the Tezos decision because the court
recognized that a contributing factor to the domestic treatment of the transaction was the fact that the cluster of nodes validating the transaction were most
densely present in the United States.253 These nodes are a critical step in the
entire transaction that did occur domestically. Without the nodes, the transaction could not have taken place. Even if the nodes did not satisfy the “critical
step” test, the domestic website would satisfy the critical step approach as
well. The website was the sole means through which investors were able to
purchase securities, and therefore critical to the process as a whole.254
The “irrevocable liability” approach is also consistent with the Tezos decision because the moment the transaction became final and the purchaser incurred irrevocable liability was when the network of nodes validated the transaction.255 The nodes were most densely clustered in the United States,256
which means the irrevocable liability must have occurred in the United States.
Some may argue that the Tezos decision was decided wrongly because it
applied Morrison’s transaction test incorrectly. One argument against the Tezos opinion is that the cluster of nodes was not enough to consider the transaction “in the United States.”257 This counterargument has some validity—the
Tezos transaction did have other critical steps that occurred outside of the
United States, such as the legal site of the seller in Switzerland.258 The Tezos
250
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defendant also made the convincing argument of the “‘bedrock principle’
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law.”259 Nevertheless, the majority
rightfully rejected these arguments.260 While it is true that there is a bedrock
principle against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, the SEC also has a
bedrock principle of protecting U.S. investors.261 The Tezos defendants threatened the protection of U.S. investors by targeting U.S. residents in the promotion of their ICO.262
Since the Tezos decision is consistent with the past interpretation of the
Morrison decision, the court’s interpretation of extraterritorial application of
§10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as applied to cryptocurrency has a sufficient legal basis. In future cases similar to Tezos, courts will have to look at numerous factors to determine if the transaction occurred in the United States. The Tezos
court examined the location of the server which hosted the securities sales
website, the residency of the website controller, and the means by which the
transaction becomes irrevocable.263 Courts will look to this non-exclusive list
of factors to find evidence about where the actual situs of buying unregistered
securities occurred.
Based on the Tezos decision, it is possible that foreign investors will be
able to bring Rule 10b-5 claims in the United States for certain ICOs as long
as the plaintiff can show that the actual situs of the transaction occurred in the
United States. If the ICO is truly global in nature and not intentionally avoiding the United States, the investor will likely be able to carry the burden of
showing the transaction was in the United States. If the sales website has substantial ties to the United States, like the website in Tezos, the plaintiffs will
be able to find relief in U.S. courts. However, the Court likely did not contemplate that the transactional test would be applied to the cryptocurrency
market one day when it made the Morrison decision in 2010. The growing
cryptocurrency market is much different than the traditional securities markets
that our case law contemplates. The SEC or Congress should provide guidance on how to regulate the cryptocurrency market with securities laws instead of our judiciary applying tests created for different contexts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the SEC has declared that some ICOs are within the purview of federal securities regulation, there has been a reexamination of various doctrines
and their applicability to the emerging cryptocurrency market. The doctrine
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of extraterritoriality has quickly become an unresolved issue within the federal regulation of cryptocurrency through securities laws.
The Supreme Court decided Morrison in 2010, which addressed extraterritorial application of Rule 10b-5 generally. Just days later, Congress superseded the Court’s Morrison decision for SEC enforcement actions by passing
Dodd-Frank. As such, the SEC can bring actions under the conducts and effects test, including actions against foreign cryptocurrency fraud if there is
sufficient conduct within the United States. The SEC has already been able to
bring enforcement actions against foreign fraudulent ICOs under these tests.
However, the private right of action is also an important enforcement tool
for U.S. securities regulation. The harsher transactional test adopted in Morrison still applies to the private cause of action. An individual can bring a 10b5 claim against a foreign issuer if the security was either traded on a U.S.
exchange or the transaction occurred in the United States. Cryptocurrencies
are not traded on any U.S. exchange yet, so cryptocurrency transactions will
have to be “in the United States” for an individual to bring a Rule 10b-5 claim.
In August, a U.S. District Court applied the Morrison “in the United
States” test to a cryptocurrency transaction.264 That court found that the transaction did occur in the United States because various factors evidenced that
the actual situs of the transaction occurred in the United States.265 These factors included the location of the website on which transactions occurred on,
the location of the person controlling the website, and the location of nodes
that finalized the transaction.266 Based on previous interpretations of Morrison
outside of the cryptocurrency context, the Tezos decision would likely be upheld if it were appealed to the Supreme Court.
However, in the wake of a brand-new form of currency, it is time for the
SEC or Congress to formulate rules and regulations specifically addressing
the complex issues arising in the emerging cryptocurrency market.
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